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1Merryman Redux: A Response to Professor 
John Yoo 
Seth Barrett Tillman* 
In a recent issue of Chapman Law Review, Professor John 
Yoo wrote, “While FDR did not join Lincoln’s blatant defiance in 
declining to obey a judicial order, [Roosevelt’s] administration 
regularly proposed laws that ran counter to Supreme Court 
precedent . . . .”1 My focus in this short, responsive Article is on 
Professor Yoo’s specific claim regarding Lincoln.  
Professor Yoo’s claim is odd—isn’t it? He tells us that Lincoln 
passively “declin[ed] to obey a judicial order,” but also 
characterizes Lincoln’s passivity as “blatant defiance.”2 Odd. He 
cites to no particular case, and he cites to no specific judicial order 
in any case. Very odd. We are all just supposed to know that the 
case was Ex parte Merryman,3 a Civil War case, and the purported 
judicial order was issued by that old curmudgeon: Chief Justice 
Roger Brooke Taney.4 In a prior publication, in 2015, Professor 
Yoo wrote that Lincoln had “ignored Taney’s order releasing
 * Lecturer, Maynooth University Department of Law, Ireland. Roinn Dlí Ollscoil 
Mhá Nuad. University of Chicago, BA (honors); Harvard Law School, JD (cum laude); 
clerked for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, and the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey. I thank Professor Josh Blackman for his comments. 
1 John Yoo, Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 215, 222 
(2018) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Professor Yoo has a long line of scholarship 
making this or similar claims. See John Yoo, Judicial Supremacy Has Its Limits, 20 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 1, 24 (2015); John Yoo, Lincoln and Habeas: of Merryman and Milligan 
and McCardle, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 505, 513 (2009); John Yoo, Lincoln at War, 38 VT. L. REV.
3, 17–20 (2013); John Yoo, Merryman and Milligan (and McCardle), 34 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
243, 244 (2009); see also Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama 
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take 
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 820 (2013).  
2 What would constitute “blatant defiance”? If Lincoln had ordered the Army to 
arrest the Chief Justice due to the latter’s having issued the Merryman opinion that could 
be fairly characterized as defiance. For a fuller discussion of what constitutes “defiance,” 
see Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship, 224 MIL.
L. REV. 481, 511–13 (2016). Note, several paragraphs or substantial parts of paragraphs of 
this Article were first published in my 2016 Military Law Review publication.
3 See Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.); 
4 A COLLECTION OF IN CHAMBERS OPINIONS BY THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1400–12 (Cynthia Rapp & Ross E. Davies comps., 2004), 
http://tinyurl.com/judtw8q [http://perma.cc/BM52-FKXU]. 
4 A COLLECTION OF IN CHAMBERS OPINIONS, supra note 3, at 1400.  
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Merryman.”5 “Ignored”—no mention of defiance here. On another 
occasion, in 2009, Professor Yoo characterized Lincoln’s response 
to Merryman as “outright presidential defiance.”6 But here the 
passive language of “ignoring” and “declining to obey” was 
absent. Now, in 2018, Professor Yoo says it is both.7 We are down 
the rabbit hole.  
So, which is it?  
[A] Lincoln passively declined to obey a judicial order;
[B] Lincoln actively defied the Chief Justice; or  
[C] Both.
The correct answer is [D] None of the Above.
***
In 2016, I made an effort to explain why the standard 
narrative (i.e., the narrative put forth by Professor Yoo and many 
others) surrounding Merryman is wrong. In other words, the 
standard restatement of the facts, reasoning, and disposition of 
Merryman appearing in many (if not most) law review articles is 
wrong.8 Some people have noticed,9 and some people (apparently) 
5 Yoo, Judicial Supremacy Has Its Limits, supra note 1, at 24 (emphasis added) 
(internal citation omitted).  
6 Yoo, Lincoln and Habeas: Of Merryman and Milligan and McCardle, supra 
note 1, at 507. 
7 See Yoo, Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power, supra note 1, at 222.  
8 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 483. I do not claim to be the first to have noticed the 
many significant problems with the standard legal narrative. See, e.g., id. at 497 n.45 
(citing BRIAN MCGINTY, THE BODY OF JOHN MERRYMAN: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE 
SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS 91–92 (2011); BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, EX PARTE MERRYMAN
AND DEBATES ON CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING THE CIVIL WAR 4 (2007); JACK STARK,
PROHIBITED GOVERNMENT ACTS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 48 (2002); Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial Supremacy, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 579, 595 n.69 (2003). See generally JONATHAN W. WHITE, ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN AND TREASON IN THE CIVIL WAR: THE TRIALS OF JOHN MERRYMAN (2011). For an 
entirely different approach to Merryman, see generally David Farnham, “A High and 
Delicate Trust”: How Ignorance and Indignation Combined to Expand President Lincoln’s 
Claimed Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus in the Case of John Merryman, 24 J. S. LEGAL 
HIST. 109 (2016). 
9 Prominent commentators, in law and other fields, discussing, quoting, or citing my 
2016 Military Law Review article include: RANDY E. BARNETT & JOSH BLACKMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CASES IN CONTEXT 532 & n.4 (3d ed. 2018); PAUL BREST ET 
AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 314 n.89, 
317 & n.90 (7th ed. 2018); LOUIS FISHER, SUPREME COURT EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER: UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEANINGS 41 n.124 (2017); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, MAKING 
HABEAS WORK: A LEGAL HISTORY 145 n.19 (2018); PETER CHARLES HOFFER, UNCIVIL
WARRIORS: THE LAWYERS’ CIVIL WAR 199 n.1 (2018); MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL.,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 403 (3d ed. 2017); 3 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Conduct of the War § 38.34 n.12 (3d ed. 2017); 1 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND 
PROCEDURE § 6.13(b)(i) n.12 (5th ed. 2017); PETER M. SHANE ET AL., SEPARATION OF 
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have not.10 The issue here is more than historical curiosity, as 
interesting and important as that may be. Rather, the issue here 
relates to the intellectual claim (made by some) that past 
presidents—including icons such as President Lincoln—knowingly 
defied or ignored (that is, “declin[ed] to obey”) federal judicial 
orders, and whether Lincoln’s conduct provides a model or 
precedent, albeit if only during war-time or other emergency. My 
view is that Lincoln’s Merryman-related conduct furnishes no such 
model. Here is why.  
POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1124 (4th ed. 2018); Josh Blackman, The 
Irrepressible Myths of Cooper v. Aaron, 107 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming June 2019) 
(manuscript at 11 n.71), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142846; 
Daniel A. Farber, Lincoln, Presidential Power, and the Rule of Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
667, 682 nn.80–83, 684 n.94, 685 n.98 (2018); Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and 
Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 492 n.146 (2018); Ethan J. Leib 
& Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism and ‘Faithful Execution’: 
Two Legal Conclusions, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming June 2019) (manuscript 
at 22 n.123), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3177968; Nicholas R. 
Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the 
Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 694 n.30 (2018); James E. Pfander 
& Jessica Dwinell, A Declaratory Theory of State Accountability, 102 VA. L. REV. 153, 184 
n.123, 186 n.133 (2016); John Fabian Witt, A Lost Theory of American Emergency 
Constitutionalism, 36 LAW & HIST. REV. 551, 569 n.84 (2018); Chase Harrington, Note, 
Zivotofsky II and National Security Decisionmaking at the Lowest Ebb, 66 DUKE L.J. 
1599, 1610 n.80 (2017); Peter William Bautz, Lincoln’s Long Shadow: Recreating the 
Legal Debate over Habeas Corpus, 1861–1863, at 21 n.99 (May 2018) (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, University of Virginia, Department of History) (on file with the University of Virginia), 
https://tinyurl.com/y96uy8ys; Tanja PorĀnik, Imperial Presidency Redux?: Presidential War 
Powers and the Bush Administration 68, 69, 123 (2016) (unpublished M.A. thesis, 
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, Faculty of Social Sciences), http://dk.fdv.uni-lj.si/magistrska/ 
pdfs/mag_porcnik-tanja.pdf [http://perma.cc/G3C8-DP9Y]; U.S.C.A. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 
(West 2018); U.S.C.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (LexisNexis 2018); Al Mackey, Did President Lincoln 
Defy a Court Order by Chief Justice Taney?, STUDENT AM. CIVIL WAR (Oct. 17, 2016), 
https://studycivilwar.wordpress.com/2016/10/17/did-president-lincoln-defy-a-court-order-by-chief-
justice-taney/ [http://perma.cc/XJ9L-AL4K]; Frank J. Williams, Fall 2016 Lincoln in the News,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN BICENTENNIAL FOUND., http://www.lincolnbicentennial.org/lincoln-
news/fall-2016 [http://perma.cc/5ZEX-78TQ]; Allen C. Guelzo, Syllabus for Princeton 
University’s Politics 488: Secession, the Civil War, and the Constitution 4 (Spring Semester 
2018) (on file with author). 
10 See, e.g., Yoo, Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power, supra note 1, at 222. 
Even post-2016, Professor John Yoo is not alone. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW 
AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 113 (2018) (“Lincoln oversaw and defended the 
defiance by Union military officers of a ruling by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in Ex parte 
Merryman. Taney claimed the power to free an alleged Confederate collaborator in the 
state of Maryland, where the Union army had effectively imposed martial law and 
detained him without trial.” (footnote omitted)); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial 
Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law in a Populist Age, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487, 
504 (2018) (“In Ex parte Merryman, Lincoln supported Union military officers in 
defying a writ of habeas corpus, issued by Chief Justice Roger Taney, in the early 
days of the Civil War.” (footnote omitted)); cf., e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Propriety of Presidential Impeachments, Past and Present, LAW & LIBERTY (July 19, 2018), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2018/07/19/the-propriety-of-presidential-impeachments-
past-and-present/ [http://perma.cc/Z8QQ-TLN8]. 
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SHORT OVERVIEW OF EX PARTE MERRYMAN
The court11 issued three orders in Merryman. But to 
understand what gave rise to those three judicial orders, one has 
to know the facts that initially brought about the litigation.  
A. Merryman: The Facts  
Following the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln, the parade 
of state secession would begin. During April 1861, Fort Sumter 
had fallen.12 Even Washington, the nation’s capital, was 
threatened by Confederate armies, disloyal state militias, and 
irregular combatants, not to mention disloyal civilians, assassins, 
and spies. To secure the capital, President Lincoln directed 
Union troops to proceed to Washington through Maryland, 
a border state.13 Mobs in Maryland had attacked Union 
troops; bridges and railway lines had been destroyed; telegraph 
wires to the capital had been cut.14 Why these attacks? Why all 
this destruction of infrastructure? No doubt different actors had 
different motives. Chance and disorder—the children of mob 
rule—certainly played some role. But it seems likely that some 
(perhaps many) sought to slow down or prevent the arrival of 
loyal troops to secure Washington and, perhaps, to secure federal 
military installations in Maryland, such as Fort McHenry in 
Baltimore. (Certainly these were the natural, expected, and 
probable consequences of the attacks, even if these results were 
not specifically intended by the actors involved.) Lincoln 
responded. On April 27, 1861, in order to secure the movement of 
Union troops through Maryland, President Lincoln issued an 
order delegating authority to General Winfield Scott to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus.15 Lincoln’s order cited no statutory 
basis for his decision.16
11 What court issued the decision in Ex parte Merryman? Some commentators say 
Taney was acting for the federal Circuit Court for the District of Maryland; other 
commentators say Merryman was issued as an in-chambers opinion under a special grant 
of authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789. I take the latter view. See A COLLECTION OF 
IN CHAMBERS OPINIONS, supra note 3, at 1400; Tillman, supra note 2, at 504 nn.55–56. 
Whatever else Merryman was, it was not a Supreme Court case—for that reason, I use 
“court,” rather than “Court” in the main text of this Article.  
12 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 483 n.4. 
13 See id. at 483 n.6. 
14 See id.
15 The Constitution states: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (emphasis added). President Lincoln’s order, issued on 
April 27, 1861, only purported to give General Scott authority “to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus.” See Abraham Lincoln, Order to General Scott (Apr. 27, 1861), in 6
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1860–1861, at 258, 258 (John G. Nicolay & John 
Hay eds., N.Y., The Lamb Publishing Co. new ed. 1894) (reproducing Lincoln’s order); 
Tillman, supra note 2, at 527 & n.116 (same). But see AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS 
2019] Merryman Redux: A Response to Professor John Yoo 5 
IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON TO GUANTANAMO BAY 358 n.3 (2017) 
(characterizing Lincoln’s April 27, 1861 order as a suspension of the “privilege”). But in 
his July 4, 1861 message to Congress, Lincoln recharacterized his prior order as 
permitting suspension of the “privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.” Abraham Lincoln, 
Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 6 COMPLETE WORKS, supra, at 
297, 308 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added). The difference between suspending the 
writ and suspending the privilege of the writ is night-and-day. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 130–31 (1866) (Davis, J.) (“The suspension of the privilege of the writ 
of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself.” (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added)); 
see also, e.g., Ex parte Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 174 (N.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1292) (Hall, J.) 
(“Such a suspension may prevent the prisoner’s discharge; but it leaves untouched the 
question of the illegality of his arrest, imprisonment, and deportation. If these are 
unlawful, the marshal and others engaged in these arrests are liable in damages in a civil 
prosecution; such damages to be assessed by a jury of the country.”). But cf., e.g., Ex parte 
Zimmerman, 132 F.2d 442, 445 (9th Cir. 1942) (Healy, J.) (“It is little to the purpose to 
attempt here an analysis of distinctions between suspension of the privilege and 
suspension of the writ.”). It is not particularly surprising that these distinctions are no 
longer understood, as this and much else relating to the Constitution’s original public 
meaning was forgotten even as early as Lincoln’s day, and, in regard to a few 
constitutional provisions and language, sometimes far earlier. But it is curious how few 
even notice there is a puzzle to be solved or a past to be explained. See, e.g., 1 BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 25 (1968) 
(“This Milligan language has been repeated in more recent cases. One may wonder, 
nevertheless, whether there is [a] basis for the claimed distinction between suspension of 
the privilege and suspension of the writ.” (footnote omitted) (citing Zimmerman, 132 F.2d 
at 445)); Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 411, 423 n.73 (2006) (“The text of the Suspension Clause makes clear 
that it is the ‘Privilege of the Writ,’ not the writ itself, that may be suspended. . . . 
Nevertheless, courts and commentators tend to refer colloquially to ‘suspending the writ’ 
or ‘suspending habeas,’ . . . .” (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 130–31)); Trevor W. Morrison, 
Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1535 n.3 (2007) 
(“‘[S]uspending the writ’ and ‘suspending habeas’ are common shorthands for suspending 
the privilege of the writ, and I will use them here.” (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 130–31)); 
Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 961, 979 (1998) (asserting that the Milligan Court’s “distinction [between 
the privilege and the writ] cuts against the conventional phrase, ‘suspension of the writ,’ 
which nonetheless has brevity in its favor”). But see, e.g., William Baude, The Judgment 
Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1853 n.255 (2008) (pointing out the same textual distinction 
regarding the “privilege” of the writ and the writ itself, but not resolving the distinction); 
Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the Arguments 
Surrounding Ex parte Merryman, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 11, 24 (2004) (“The general 
consensus, even prior to the Civil War, was that suspension did not mean that habeas 
corpus itself was suspended, but rather that the privilege guarded by the writ was 
suspended.” (citing WILLIAM S. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 42 
(photo. reprt. 1997) (1893))); Tor Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article 1, 
Section 9, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1475, 1496 (2005) (“The privilege of the writ can be construed as separate from 
the writ itself; the privilege may be viewed as the ends (‘discharge, bail, or a speedy trial’) 
and the writ itself as merely the means towards this end.” (quoting WILLIAM F. DUKER,
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 141–42, 171 n.121 (1980))); Note, 
Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1265–66 (1970) 
(denominating the Milligan Court’s discussion of the Suspension Clause’s “privilege of the 
writ” language as “cryptic,” and suggesting that “the [Milligan] Court saw the ‘privilege’ 
as the further proceedings and the eventual discharge. By the ‘writ’ the Court meant what 
is referred to today as a show cause order, i.e., not an order to produce the body but a 
preliminary request for a ‘return,’ or written justification of the detention.” (footnote 
omitted)); Bautz, supra note 9 passim (collecting some early authorities addressing the 
distinction). Compare, e.g., Emily Calhoun, The Accounting: Habeas Corpus and Enemy 
Combatants, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 121–22 n.216 (2008) (citing Milligan for the proposition 
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that habeas jurisprudence distinguishes executive accountability goals from remedial goals 
and phases of habeas litigation), with John Harrison, The Original Meaning of the Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Clause 3 (University of Virginia School of Law Public Law & Legal 
Theory Paper Series 2018-47, Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3227985 (“A 
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is legislation granting the 
executive extremely broad discretion to detain.”), with id. at 40 (“[T]he privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus is the legal interest that the writ characteristically protects. To 
suspend that privilege is to contract that legal interest temporarily.”), with Lee Kovarsky, 
Prisoners and Habeas Privileges under the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 VAND. L. REV. 609, 
614–15 (2014) (“The privilege is a prisoner’s entitlement to ask that the habeas power be 
exercised.”), and Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension A Political Question, 59 STAN. L. REV.
333, 396–97 (2006) (conflating the initial and subsequent phases of habeas litigation, but 
still citing Milligan without explanation). 
My view is that suspension of the evidentiary privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
precludes a court (or even an Executive Branch officer) from taking cognizance of a party’s 
pleading (or invoking) the writ (once granted to that party by that court or any other 
court of record) in subsequent contempt and enforcement proceedings (and, perhaps, in 
other collateral and ancillary proceedings). For example, Merryman II (i.e., granting an 
order to serve an attachment for contempt where the defendant failed to produce the 
prisoner-plaintiff). Suspending the writ (as opposed to suspending the privilege of the 
writ) precludes a court from granting the writ, on the merits, in the first instance. 
For example, Merryman I (i.e., an ex parte habeas order to produce a prisoner), or a 
Merryman III-like order (i.e., a habeas order to release a prisoner—albeit, of course, 
this did not actually happen in Merryman). When both the writ and/or the privilege of 
the writ are suspended, federal courts (having general federal question jurisdiction) 
will still have jurisdiction to determine if the suspension or suspensions themselves are 
constitutional—unless Congress has validly stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to 
do so. The scope of Congress’s power to engage in such jurisdiction stripping is a complex 
subject, and one well beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 
HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1398 (1953) (“[W]here statutory jurisdiction to issue the writ obtains, 
but the privilege of it has been suspended in particular circumstances, the Court has 
declared itself ready to consider the validity of the suspension and, if it is found invalid, of 
the detention.”); Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C.
L. REV. 251, 289 (2005). See generally Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 
1948) (Chase, J.). Recently, the Suspension Clause has received renewed interest and 
full-length treatment in books, but the meaning of the clause’s text, its actual words—they 
remain largely an undiscovered country. See generally, e.g., TYLER, supra, at 3–4, 15, 99, 
123, 133, 359 (taking a historical approach absent textual analysis); Amanda L. Tyler, 
Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 678 n.372 (2009) (citing Neuman, 
supra, at 979 favorably). But see, e.g., Baude, supra, at 1853 n.255; but cf., e.g., Bautz, supra
note 9 passim.
I have put down some truly remarkable support for my position here in another paper 
which this Article is too small to contain. Cf. Seth Barrett Tillman, A Play on the Suspension 
Clause, NEW REFORM CLUB (Aug. 11, 2016, 4:04 PM), https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2016/08/a-
play-on-suspension-clause.html [http://perma.cc/HP6M-YTBJ]. Indeed, I submitted a prior draft 
of this lengthy footnote as my abstract to the Tenth Annual Originalism Works-in-Progress 
Conference. See Tenth Annual Hugh & Hazel Darling Foundation Originalism Works-in-Progress 
Conference, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW (last visited July 27, 2018), 
http://www.sandiego.edu/events/law/detail.php?_focus=66934 [http://perma.cc/RXD9-FA8C]; 
see also Seth Barrett Tillman, What is the “Privilege” of the Writ of Habeas Corpus?, NEW REFORM 
CLUB (July 27, 2018, 2:41 AM), https://tinyurl.com/ycupmlu7 [http://perma.cc/Y695-PLGV].  
16 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 485. Here and throughout this Article, I quote freely 
from my 2016 Military Law Review publication. See id. at 483–85.
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B. Merryman I: The Ex Parte Order to Produce the Prisoner  
John Merryman was from a long-established land-owning 
and politically connected Maryland family, as was his wife. 
At the outbreak of the Civil War, he had already been elected to 
public office as a member and president of the Baltimore County 
Commission.17 Rightly or not, federal military authorities suspected 
John Merryman of being an officer of a pro-secession militia group 
which allegedly had conspired to destroy (and did destroy) bridges 
and railway lines. As a result, at around 2:00 AM, on Saturday, May 
25, 1861, United States Army personnel seized Merryman, and they 
subsequently transferred him to and detained him at Fort McHenry 
in Maryland.18 The next day—Sunday, May 26, 1861—Merryman’s 
Maryland counsel, George M. Gill and George H. Williams, presented 
Merryman’s habeas corpus petition to Chief Justice Roger Brooke 
Taney at the Chief Justice’s Washington home.19 Later that day, 
Sunday, May 26, 1861, the Chief Justice issued an ex parte order, 
Merryman I, directing General George Cadwalader, the only 
named defendant and the Army officer having overall command of 
the military district including Fort McHenry: (i) to appear before 
Chief Justice Taney the next day—on Monday, May 27, 1861 at 
11:00 AM—in a court room in Baltimore; (ii) to explain the legal 
basis for Merryman’s detention by military authorities; and (iii) to 
“produce”20 (as opposed to “release”) the body of John Merryman at 
that hearing.21
The writ, i.e., Merryman I, was issued by Chief Justice 
Taney and served by the United States Marshal on General 
Cadwalader the same day: Sunday, May 26, 1861, at around 5:30 
PM.22 The hearing was scheduled for Monday, May 27, 1861, at 
11:00 AM. As a result, Cadwalader, a Pennsylvania native, had 
less than one full business day: (i) to consult (much less 
coordinate) with the United States Attorney for Maryland, with 
the Attorney General in Washington, and with the Army’s law 
officers; and (ii) to find a private attorney in the Maryland bar to 
represent his personal interests in high-stakes litigation.23 As a 
result, it is not entirely surprising that Cadwalader chose not to 
attend the May 27, 1861 hearing. Instead, he sent Colonel R. M. 
Lee.24 At the hearing, Colonel Lee presented the court with a 
17 See id. at 485 & n.11.  
18 See id. at 487 & n.13.  
19 See id. at 488 & n.14. 
20 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 145 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.).  
21 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 488.  
22 See id. at 499 n.47.  
23 See id.
24 See id. at 512 n.73.  
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signed response from Cadwalader laying out the General’s 
defense. For example, Cadwalader argued that habeas corpus had 
been lawfully suspended under presidential authority. Cadwalader’s 
response also sought a postponement to seek additional direction 
from the President if the court should determine that Cadwalader’s 
defense was insufficient. Furthermore, Cadwalader did not produce 
Merryman at the hearing as he was instructed to do by Chief Justice 
Taney’s ex parte order.25
C. Merryman II: The Attachment 
Because General Cadwalader, the named defendant, failed to 
produce Merryman, Chief Justice Taney, on May 27, 1861, 
directed the United States Marshal to serve an attachment for 
contempt on Cadwalader.26 The Marshal sought to serve the 
attachment on the morning of Tuesday, May 28, 1861 at Fort 
McHenry, but the Marshal was not admitted. Many at the time, 
including perhaps Chief Justice Taney and others since, believed, 
and continue to believe, that this was a Cromwellian 
civilian-military confrontation.27 In other words, the military 
authorities prevailed not as a matter of established legal right as 
determined by the courts, but because the Army (which was 
acting under the direction of the President) had greater firepower 
than the United States Marshal (who was serving the 
attachment order under instructions from the Chief Justice). As 
a result, the Marshal left the Fort.28 He reached the courthouse 
prior to noon on May 28, 1861, and he came without Cadwalader 
and Merryman.29
D. Merryman III: The Final Order  
In his opinion, Chief Justice Taney expressed the view that 
the President had no unilateral power to suspend habeas corpus. 
In other words, under the Constitution, only Congress can suspend 
habeas corpus. He also took the position that “[a] military officer 
has no right to arrest and detain a person not subject to the rules 
and articles of war, for an offence against the laws of the United 
States, except in aid of the judicial authority, and subject to its 
control.”30 For those reasons, he concluded: “It is, therefore, very 
25 See id. at 489–90.  
26 See id. at 490. 
27 See id.
28 See id. at 491 n.25. 
29 See id. at 490–91. 
30 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 145 & 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.). 
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clear that John Merryman, the petitioner, is entitled to be set at 
liberty and discharged immediately from imprisonment.”31
Noting that his attachment order, Merryman II, “ha[d] been 
resisted by a force too strong for me [Taney] to overcome,”32 Chief 
Justice Taney’s final judicial order did not command Cadwalader, 
Lincoln, the Army, or anyone else to release Merryman. Instead, 
Chief Justice Taney’s final order directed the clerk of the Circuit 
Court for the District of Maryland to transmit a copy of the 
proceedings and his opinion to President Lincoln, where it would 
“remain for that high officer, in fulfilment of his constitutional 
obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to 
determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process 
of the United States to be respected and enforced.”33 Merryman 
was not released as a consequence of Chief Justice Taney’s 
decision, nor was he brought before a military tribunal. Instead, 
Merryman remained detained at Fort McHenry until he was 
transferred to the federal civilian authorities, and then he was 
indicted for treason in the District Court for Maryland on July 
10, 1861. He was released on bail on or about July 13, 1861. 
Merryman was never brought to trial.34
Again, Chief Justice Taney delivered an oral opinion on May 
28, 1861, which ended live proceedings in court. Subsequently, on 
Saturday, June 1, 1861, he filed an extensive written opinion. The 
written opinion was put on file with the United States Circuit 
Court for the District of Maryland.35
Chief Justice Taney’s final order (not his opinion) stated:  
I shall, therefore, order all the proceedings in this case, with my 
opinion, to be filed and recorded in the [C]ircuit [C]ourt of the United 
States for the [D]istrict of Maryland, and direct the clerk to transmit a 
copy, under seal, to the [P]resident of the United States. It will then 
remain for that high officer, in fulfilment of his constitutional 
obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” to 
determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the 
United States to be respected and enforced.36
31 Id. at 147; Tillman, supra note 2, at 492.  
32 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153. 
33 Id. (quoting the Take Care Clause). 
34 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 493.  
35 See id. at 491–92.  
36 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153 (quoting the Take Care Clause) (emphasis added). 
This is the order as reported in Federal Cases. The report of the order in the case’s file 
(storing the original documents) in the Maryland state archives is even more limited than 
what is reported in Federal Cases. See 1 June 1861, Order that opinion be filed and recorded 
in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, directing the Clerk 
transmit a copy under seal to the President of the United States, ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 
(BIOGRAPHICAL SERIES): JOHN MERRYMAN (1824–1881) (last visited July 13, 2018), 
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/001500/001543/html/casepapers.html. 
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In short, Chief Justice Taney’s final judicial order, 
Merryman III, did not command Cadwalader or anyone else to 
release Merryman. Instead, Chief Justice Taney’s final order 
meekly directed the clerk of the Circuit Court for the District of 
Maryland merely to transmit a copy of the proceedings and his 
(i.e., the Chief Justice’s) opinion to President Lincoln.37 The 
express language of the order itself left it to the President to 
determine the scope of his own response.  
As explained, Professor Yoo’s claim is that “Lincoln’s 
[conduct amounted to] blatant defiance in declining to obey a 
judicial order.”38 To be clear, Professor Yoo’s claim is not that 
Cadwalader, Lincoln’s military subordinate, disobeyed a court 
order. (Such a claim would be true: Cadwalader did disobey 
Merryman I: the ex parte order—albeit, Cadwalader’s conduct 
can be explained as consistent with standard practices in the 
context of ex parte temporary restraining orders.39) Nor is 
Professor Yoo’s claim that Lincoln authorized the suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus prior to Merryman’s seizure by the 
Army. (Such a claim would be true: Lincoln, in fact, did authorize 
such a suspension—albeit, its legal validity can be questioned.) 
Rather, Professor Yoo’s claim is that after Chief Justice Taney 
issued an order (Merryman I, Merryman II, and/or Merryman III), 
Lincoln “declin[ed] to obey” it, and that such inactivity can be 
fairly characterized as “blatant defiance.”  
The only defendant in Merryman was General Cadwalader. 
Lincoln was not a named party in Merryman. Lincoln was not 
served with process. Lincoln had no meaningful notice and 
opportunity to be heard during the judicial proceedings while they 
were ongoing.40 Indeed, there is no good evidence that Lincoln even 
knew of the proceedings until May 30, 1861—after live judicial 
proceedings had ended on May 28, 1861.41 Likewise, Lincoln would 
not have received the final order, Merryman III, along with Chief 
Justice Taney’s written opinion, from the clerk of the court, until 
on or after June 1, 1861, when the final order was signed and filed 
with the circuit court—again all after live judicial proceedings had 
ended on May 28, 1861.42 As a general rule, a stranger to a 
lawsuit—a non-party—a person who had no opportunity to be 
37 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 492.  
38 Yoo, Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power, supra note 1, at 222.  
39 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 515–18.  
40 See id. at 495 n.44. 
41 Albeit, it is possible that Lincoln read newspaper reports of Merryman on the 
evening of May 27, 1861 or that Lincoln received correspondence from Army law officers 
as early as the 27th. Neither of which amounts to notice and the opportunity to be heard 
in the sense of how that phrase is ordinarily used. See id. at 500 n.49. 
42 See id. at 498–500, 499 n.48, 537.  
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heard—is not bound to obey any judicial order issued in such 
a lawsuit.43 As a non-party, Lincoln no more “ignored” or 
“declin[ed] to obey” the three judicial orders in Merryman than 
did Jefferson Davis, or you, or me.44 Suggesting that Lincoln 
“defi[ed]” such an order is strange, and characterizing Lincoln’s 
conduct as “blatant defiance” is stranger still. If the thrust of 
Professor Yoo’s claim was that Lincoln had been in privity45 with 
Cadwalader, and for that reason accountable for Cadwalader’s 
conduct or culpable for his (i.e., Lincoln’s) own failure to conform 
to Chief Justice Taney’s orders, such an argument has yet to be 
made by Professor Yoo or by anyone else.  
I suspect that the real gravamen of Professor Yoo’s position is 
not that Lincoln was a party (or in privity with a party) and formally 
bound by the orders as a party (or privy) might be.46 Rather, I suspect 
that Professor Yoo’s position is that, under the Take Care Clause, 
President Lincoln, as General Cadwalader’s ultimate superior at the 
top of the chain of command, had ongoing supervisory responsibility 
for Cadwalader’s conduct—before, during, and after the conclusion 
of Merryman.47 Is it really so obvious that a superior’s failure to 
supervise a subordinate, where the subordinate acts lawlessly, 
should be characterized as “defiance,” much less “blatant 
defiance”? If this is Professor Yoo’s position, it is, at the very 
least, undertheorized. What the exact scope of the President’s 
duties (if any) under the Take Care Clause remains unsettled 
even today—it was certainly unsettled in 1861—and even 
assuming that any judicially cognizable duties (as opposed to 
abstract, non-justiciable, or aspirational political obligations) flow 
from that constitutional provision, any such duties must have been 
greatly attenuated under the conditions faced by Lincoln during a 
political crisis and a hot civil war. Characterizing Lincoln’s 
conduct as “blatant defiance,” and making that charge stick, 
requires more, much more, than Professor Yoo’s ipse dixit.
43 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.); see also D’Arcy 
v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 176 (1850) (Catron, J.).  
44 In 2016, after some six hours of closely proofreading the penultimate draft of my 
Military Law Review article with me, my Irish legal research assistant left my office and 
said: “I am going home now—where I intend to ignore the Chief Justice’s order.” See
Tillman, supra note 2, at 481 n.* (thanking Paul Brady LLB). He got it.  
45 See generally Martin, 490 U.S. passim.
46 There is no occasion to address whether Lincoln violated Chief Justice Taney’s opinion. 
Even assuming that one can defy an opinion, whatever that might mean, Professor Yoo has 
made no such claim. Professor Yoo’s article spoke to declining to obey and defying a judicial 
order, not an opinion. See Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 126 (1999) (“The operative legal act performed by a court is the entry of 
a judgment; an opinion is simply an explanation of reasons for that judgment.”).  
47 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Take Care Clause).  
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Finally, which order does Professor Yoo think Lincoln 
“declin[ed] to obey” and “blatantly def[ied]”? As to Merryman I and 
Merryman II, by May 30, 1861, when Lincoln first had a report of 
the case,48 live judicial proceedings had already ended and actual 
compliance with these preliminary orders (as written) was no longer 
feasible. It was no longer possible to “produce” John Merryman at 
the hearing—which is what Merryman I demanded—because the 
hearing had already ended. Likewise, once the final order had been 
issued, once litigation had ended, Merryman II—the attachment for 
civil contempt—was a legal nullity.49 More importantly, compliance 
was no longer possible: the attachment order demanded that 
Cadwalader appear before Chief Justice Taney on May 28, 1861, 
at noon. After May 28, 1861, compliance with this order—as 
written—was no longer possible. What about Merryman III? Did 
Lincoln “decline to obey” or “blatantly defy” that order? The simple 
answer is “no.” Again, Lincoln was not a party—so he had no 
obligation to obey any order. More importantly, the order did not 
direct Lincoln (or anyone else) to take any specific course of conduct 
in regard to John Merryman (or any other habeas applicant).50 So 
any critique of Lincoln’s conduct based on his (purported) passively 
failing to obey or his (purported) actively “defy[ing],” much less 
“blatantly defy[ing],” the Merryman III order, makes little sense. To 
be clear, this interpretation of Merryman III, i.e., that Lincoln could 
not have defied the order because no concrete relief was awarded, is 
not some modern invention. This view was well understood by 
Lincoln’s contemporaries. During the Civil War, judges, other 
than Chief Justice Taney, sitting on federal and state courts, 
self-consciously followed the Merryman precedent, which they 
understood as granting the habeas applicant no concrete relief.51
Likewise, in responding to President Lincoln’s and the public’s 
concerns surrounding Merryman, Attorney General Bates’s July 
48 Lincoln received a report from the United States Attorney for Maryland on May 
30, 1861. See Tillman, supra note 2, at 499 n.48.  
49 See id. at 523 & n.103; Philip A. Hostak, Note, International Union, United Mine 
Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm Shift in the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal 
Contempt, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 181, 185 & n.26 (1995) (“[I]f the underlying controversy 
giving rise to a civil contempt action is settled or is otherwise terminated, the contempt 
proceeding becomes moot, and the sanctions must end.” (citing Gompers v. Buck’s Stove 
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 452 (1911) (Lamar, J.))). 
50 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 492. 
51 See Ex parte McQuillon, 16 F. Cas. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 8294) (Betts, 
J.) (“[Judge Betts] would, however, follow out that case [Merryman], but would express 
no opinion whatever, as it would be indecorous on his part to oppose the [C]hief 
[J]ustice. He would therefore decline taking any action on the writ at all.” (emphasis 
added)); In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359, 371 (1863) (Dixon, C.J.) (“I deem it advisable, adhering 
to the precedent set by other courts and judges under like circumstances, and out of respect 
to the national authorities, to withhold [granting habeas relief] until they shall have had 
time to consider what steps they should properly take in the case.” (emphasis added)).  
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5, 1861 memorandum only addressed the President’s obligations in 
situations analogous to Merryman I, i.e., the ex parte preliminary 
production order. On its face, Bates’s memorandum did not address 
final orders like Merryman III.52 There was simply no need to do so 
because Lincoln’s conduct in relation to the final judicial order was 
legal in all respects, and obviously so.  
Academics should welcome debate—even when our own views 
are subjected to the closest scrutiny and critique. But when our 
views are contradicted, with novel argument and new evidence, our 
response ought not be to continue as if nothing has changed. Now it 
may be that the new Merryman narrative,53 and I, have failed (and 
will continue to fail) to convince Professor Yoo. But if that is so, I 
hope he will tell us (or, at least, me) why. If I have convinced him, I 
would urge him to tell his audience: all those who have swallowed 
the Merryman-red-pill-to-historical-&-legal-wonderland. Of course, 
there is a third possibility—Professor Yoo is not sure. And that 
would be the most interesting result of all.   
52 Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74 
(July 5, 1861) (Bates, A.G.). Bates’s memorandum addressed two questions: 
 1. In the present time of a great and dangerous insurrection, has the President 
the discretionary power to cause to be arrested and held in custody, persons 
known to have criminal intercourse with the insurgents, or persons against 
whom there is probable cause for suspicion of such criminal complicity? 
 2. In such cases of arrest, is the President justified in refusing to obey a writ of 
habeas corpus issued by a court or a judge, requiring him or his agent to 
produce the body of the prisoner, and show the cause of his caption and 
detention, to be adjudged and disposed of by such court or judge?  
Id. at 75 (emphasis added).  
53 See supra note 8 (collecting authorities). 
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